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We augment a model of endogenous credit cycles by Matsuyama et al.
(2016) with human capital to study the impact of human capital on the
stability of central economic aggregates. Thus we offer a linkage bet-
ween human capital formation and credit market instability on a macro-
level combined with an analysis of functional income distribution. Hu-
man capital is modelled as pure external effect of production following
a learning-by-producing approach. Agents have access to two different
investment projects, which differ substantially in their next generations
spillover effects. Some generate pecuniary externalities and technologi-
cal spillovers through human capital formation whereas others fail to do
so and are subject to financial frictions. Due to this endogenous credit
cycles occur and a pattern of boom and bust cycles can be observed. We
explore the impact of human capital on the stability of the system by
numerical simulations which indicate that human capital has an ambigu-
ous effect on the evolution of the output. Depending on the strength of
the financial friction and the output share of human capital it either am-
plifies or mitigates output fluctuations. This analysis shows that human
capital is an essential factor for economic stability and sustainable gro-
wth as a high human capital share tends to make the system’s stability
robust against shocks.
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1 Introduction
As the complexity of our financial system emerged distortions in credit markets
seem to experience a rising intrigue for economists. Especially when it comes to
business cycle models frictions on those markets become essential for a broad range
of dynamics and fundamental instability. To certain extent those fluctuations can
be explained by exogenous shocks amplified or mitigated by frictions on financial
markets (see, i.e., Bernanke & Gertler (1989) or Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)). Howe-
ver, endogenous explanations for persistent credit cycles appear to be scarce. Recent
contributions are in the spirit of the Kindleberger-Minsky hypothesis (Kindleberger
(1996) and Minsky (1982)) which explain instability as endogenous phenomenon.
However, the role of human capital in such a setting remains unclear even though
it is an essential factor in long-run economic development1. After the seminal work
of Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro (2001), a vast branch of publications focus on
the role of human capital when studying business cycles and economic growth issues
especially in an empirical context. Most of the empirical literature works on on
education, schooling and varieties of skill achievement and its impact on economic
well being (for an overview, see Krueger & Lindahl (2001) or Acemoglu & Autor
(2012)). Briefly summarized most studies find that human capital, in general, en-
hances productivity and thus increases growth. But little is known about the effects
in a nonlinear dynamic setting, especially when it comes to models where credit
markets are involved and irregular cyclicity is an issue. Therefore we suggest to
include human capital as production factor in a credit cycle model. Although there
are recent contributions on micro level (see, eg., Andolfatto & Gervais (2006), Cunha
et al. (2010), Lochner & Monge-Naranjo (2011) or Abbott et al. (2013)) where hu-
man capital accumulation is analysed in a setting where education is costly and
financed with credit, we want to study it in a more aggregate level and its impact
on stability.
Thus, a good starting point to cover those facts is Matsuyama (2013) and Mat-
suyama et al. (2016) who propose a credit cycle model where financial market fricti-
ons cause irregular cycles on an aggregate level. Due to its nonlinear (regime swit-
ching) set-up it is able to generate irregular boom and bust cycles without any
exogenous shocks, recapitulating the Kindleberger-Minsky hypothesis (Kindleber-
ger (1996) and Minsky (1982)) in a formal economic framework with fully ratio-
nal agents. Moreover, the results are in line with state-of-the-art empirical rese-
1See contributions in growth theory, i.e. Uzawa (1965), Romer (1986, 1990), augmented with
human capital in Lucas (1988) or Benhabib & Perli (1994)
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arch about credit cycles (see, e.g., Schularick & Taylor (2012), Gali (2014), Thakor
(2015)). The existing model uses for simulation purposes a simple Cobb-Douglas
technology with physical capital and labour in a two-period overlapping generation
model. Our aim is to analyse the effects of human capital on both, the economic
implications and the features of the dynamical system (long run stability). In fact,
we take a production function with labour, physical and human capital as a starting
point and assume that human capital is a pure external effect of production and
transferred intergenerationally. In an economy where young and old generations
coexist (i.e. overlapping generation structure), old agents transfer their knowledge
about production processes to the young. On the one hand, this drives up the ex-
pected profits (which are assumed to be the realised profits, i.e. perfect foresight is
assumed) of projects with positive pecuniary external effects (i.e. ”Good” projects)
and thus make it easier to compete with non-spillover but more profitable projects
(i.e. ”Bad” projects)2. On the other hand it rises the wage rate of the young which
is crucial for following reasons: After their working period, young agents need to
allocate their accumulated net worth (marginal product from labour) to maximise
their second period consumption. They choose between Good and Bad projects and
lending, but as the latter is subject to a borrowing constraint it can only be financed
by a collateral. Thus, an increase of the net worth eases the borrowing constraint.
Therefore it needs to be studied if one effect dominates the other or, put differently,
how they are interlinked. We expect significant contributions to the question of
stability features of human capital in an overlapping generations, nonlinear (regime
switching) model setting with both, pecuniary and technological externalities.
Subsequently, the model set-up allows us to rigorously analyse the income distri-
bution over the business cycle. Not only since Piketty (2014) the linkages between
personal income inequality, functional income distribution and business cycles are
prevalent in economic analyses. Most of the empirical studies provide results about
(personal) income inequality based on extensive microeconomic survey data throug-
hout a lot of countries and samples. Even though, we will focus on the impact
of aggregated credit market imperfections, a very recent contribution by Hai &
Heckman (2017) gives, inter alia, a comprehensive survey about models of agents’
educational choice under individual credit constraints. In a more business cycle
related setting, Castello & Domenech (2002) elaborate on an assessment of inequa-
lity of human capital as a factor and compare it with personal income distribution
results. In this paper, we provide a formal framework which allows us to analyse
2This is taken from Matsuyama et al. (2016) who offers a discussion and a justification of this
terminology.
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changes of functional income distribution caused by both, credit market frictions
and structural changes on a macrolevel. Due to the overlapping two-period genera-
tion structure, we can easily trace the income changes across generations. Our main
finding points towards human capital not only tends to stabilise output fluctuations
but also stabilises the functional income distribution across generations in sense of
periodic fluctuations.
Thus our paper provides three major contributions, consistently modelled in a fra-
mework with rational and optimising agents: First, we analyse the effect of human
capital on the stability of an economic system with credit market frictions. Most
interestingly, we find that especially in transition periods when human capital gains
importance, instabilities regarding output evolution occur. Nevertheless, human ca-
pital drives out the instability generating financial frictions pointing out that human
capital in general has a stabilizing effect. Second, we provide an insight in the functi-
onal income distribution over different cycle periods and observe again stabilising
impacts of human capital. Finally, as the model is continuous piecewise smooth,
two dimensional in physical (kt) and human capital (ht), with seven parameters,
we highlight the importance of regime switching models in economics. We are able
to show that dynamic phenomena might have a strong economic interpretation and
simply get lost by applying a linearisation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we will briefly sum up
the original model and the key mechanisms which lead to fluctuations and instability
but omit the detailed derivation, as this can be found in the aforementioned publi-
cations. Section 3 continues by describing the human capital extensions and the
new dynamical law of motion. Section 4 is dedicated to a simulation exercise where
we use numerical simulations to analyse various scenarios and compare it to the
original publication. In Section 5 we give a discussion about the income assessment
and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model and the Mechanism
This section provides a concise summary of the original model structure, the exten-
sions and the core mechanism. The basic framework is close to Matsuyama et al.
(2016) which uses an overlapping generations model (see Diamond (1965)) with two
period lives. Time is discrete and extends from zero to infinity, t = 1, 2, 3, ... . In
each period one final good, the numeraire, is produced which can be used for in-
vestments or for consumption. As we want to study the dynamic effects of human
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capital, the final goods sector uses following Cobb-Douglas technology
Yt = AK
α
t H
γ
t L
1−α−γ
t , (1)
where A denotes some exogenous total factor productivity; Kt is physical capital,
Ht is human capital and Lt is simple labour at time t; and (α + γ) < 1 are the
production elasticities. Put differently, those parameters can be seen as cost share
of the total production. A higher value of the parameter thus signals a higher
importance in the production process. Using the notation in ”units of labour” and
the normalisation (1− α)A = 1
Yt
Lt
= yt =
1
1− αk
α
t h
γ
t . (2)
The production function is inspired by Mankiw et al. (1992). However, our appro-
ach substantially differs, since we do not consider a resource requirement for human
capital formation. We assume that human capital formation is a pure external ef-
fect of production (’learning by producing’) and that human capital is transferred
from the old to the young generation. Thus, a straightforward law of motion for the
accumulation follows
ht+1 = σhyt + (1− δh)ht, (3)
where σh is the strength of the external effect and δh a depreciation rate on human
capital which we consider to be well below unity.
Factor markets are competitive and the factors are rewarded with
ρt =
∂f(kt, ht)
∂kt
=
α
1− αk
α−1
t h
γ
t and wt = f(kt, ht)− kt
∂f(kt, ht)
∂kt
= kαt h
γ
t . (4)
This formulation implies that workers do not only receive the marginal product of
labour, but also the marginal product of human capital (which is similar to Mankiw
et al. (1992)).
Agents are born at the beginning of each period and stay active for two periods.
Young agents are endowed with one unit of labour and the human capital that they
inherited from the previous generation; they work in first period and thereby they
accumulate human capital. At the end of first period, i.e. in point of time t + 1,
they earn the factor reward of labour, save everything (savings rate equals unity)
and thus accumulate wealth. At the same time, the young generation becomes the
old generation (and a new young generation is born to which the human capital
is transferred) and they have to decide how to use wealth (accumulated in form
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of the numeraire) in order to maximise consumption at the end of second period.
Fig. 1 presents a graphical description of the generational set-up. Agents have three
Fig. 1: Overlapping generation structure
possibilities to allocate wealth: They can (1) invest in a ”Good” investment project
or (2) they can start a ”Bad” investment project; in addition, (3) they can lend
funds to other same cohort agents. Good projects are investments in the final goods
production sector that uses the final good as physical capital input, kt+1. Assuming
perfect foresight, the expected return of this investment project type is equal to
the marginal product of capital, ρet+1 = ρt+1. Thus, Good projects fuel production
processes that generate labour income for the next generation and induce human
capital formation. Instead, Bad projects do not involve production processes. They
can be seen as simple trading or storing activities, and essentially fail to create any
positive externalities for the next generations. Those type of projects are assumed to
require an indivisible amount of m > wt units of the final good and to transform it
into mB units of the final good in period t+1. The known and constant parameter
B > 0 indicates the profitability of the Bad projects. Implicitly, it is assumed that
agents who want to run those projects need to borrow m−wt > 0 at an interest rate
rt+1; this interest rate is agreed upon in t+1 and has to be paid at the end of period
t+1. Since Bad projects require credit financing lending is a third option for wealth
allocation. Given the possibility of investing in Good projects, the interest rate on
credit has to be equal to the expected marginal product of capital rt+1 = ρ
e
t+1 in
equilibrium. Now two constraints enter the game: The profitability constraint and
the borrowing constraint. The profitability constraint follows from the consideration
that agents only intend to start Bad projects if return is greater or equal to the return
of simple lending or investing in Good projects. Thus,
B ≥ rt+1 = ρet+1
(
=
∂f(kt+1, ht+1)
∂kt+1
)
= ρt+1. (5)
The borrowing constraint takes capital market imperfections into account: Due
to financial frictions agents can borrow only against a collateral. In addition, only
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a fraction of the expected project revenue can be pledged for the repayment which
reflects the credit market imperfection and is denoted by 0 < µ < 1. This minima-
listic introduction of a financial friction follows the pledgeability approach proposed
by Tirole (2005) and can be justified by some kind of agency problems which may
arise in economic transactions. The reader is kindly referred to Matsuyama (2008)
for a detailed discussion in a macroeconomic context. As information is complete
the borrowing constraint requires that:
µmB ≥ rt+1(m− kαt hγt ) or (6)
µmB
m− kαt hγt
≥ rt+1. (7)
The lender will only lend up to µmB
rt+1
which implicitly sets a minimum net worth
requirement3 for agents interested in starting a Bad project. If the financial friction
is severe (i.e. µ = 0) the left hand side of Eq. (7) equals zero implying that the net
worth of the agents is always too low to start a Bad project. The other extreme
case is the absence of a friction (i.e. µ = 1) where agents can fully pledge revenues
as a collateral to lenders. The borrowing constraint, Eq. (7), sets a tighter limit for
rt+1 than the profitability constraint, Eq. (5), if:
µmB
m− kαt hγt
< B (8)
kt < kµ =
(
m(1− µ)h−γt
)1/α
(9)
The critical value, kµ which is a function of human capital, separates two regions in
the [k, h]-phase space (see Fig. 2), where either BC or PC is binding. It is strictly
decreasing with higher k and lower h.
Analogously to Matsuyama et al. (2016) we define the maximal pledgeable rate
of return, R(kt, ht), that an agent with the net worth wt = k
α
t h
γ
t can pledge to the
lender without violating a constraint:
R(kt, ht) ≡ Bmin
{ µ
1− kαt hγt
m
, 1
}
=

µB
1− kαt hγt
m
if kt ≤ kµ i.e. if BC is tighter
B if kt ≥ kµ i.e. if PC is tighter
(10)
3 Recall, that the net worth of young agents at the end of their ’working’ period equals wt = k
α
t h
γ
t .
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3 The dynamic equations and the phase space
We are now ready to derive the law of motions for physical and human capital. In
equilibrium following equation must hold with equality:
ρet+1 = ρt+1 = rt+1 =
∂f(kt+1, ht+1)
∂kt+1
=
α
1− αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1 ≥ R(kt, ht) (11)
Otherwise, if ρt+1 = rt+1 < R(kt, ht) would hold with strict inequality, agents
always want to start Bad projects (higher returns) but nobody would provide the
required credit as the rate of return of lending is to low, which is a contradiction
and therefore not possible. In the case of ρt+1 > R(kt, ht) agents would never run
Bad projects due to a violation of the profitability or the borrowing constraint.
Following Matsuyama et al. (2016), we also differentiate a non-distortionary and a
distortionary case (see Fig. 2 for the phase space representation):
3.1 The non-distortionary case
The non-distortionary case in which the borrowing constraint is never binding and
aggregate credit is thus allocated efficiently, occurs if ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
∣∣∣
kt=kµ
> B. In that
case, for low kt and thus a high return on Good projects,
∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
> B and Bad
projects will not be started as they are less profitable than the Good. All available
credit flows into the Good projects and the corresponding dynamic equation is
kt+1 = ΨL = k
α
t h
γ
t . (12)
Increasing kt reduces the return on Good projects, until reaching a threshold
kB > kµ, defined by kt+1 = k
α
t h
γ
t (= wt) and
∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= B; the profitability of
Good and Bad projects is equal. Beyond that point any additional credit flows in
Bad projects and investment in Good projects kt+1 is determined by the profitability
constraint, i.e. by ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= B. The corresponding dynamic equation is4
kt+1 = ΨR =
(
1
B
α
1− α
) 1
1−α
(ht+1)
γ
1−α . (13)
Note that in this case the financial frictions parameter µ does not occur in the
dynamics; thus, this case is indeed non- distortionary. The boundary condition for
4For notational purpose, we refer to the regime Ψi ∈ {L,M,R} according to its location, either
left, middle or right, in the phase space.
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this case is ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
∣∣∣
kt=kµ
= B. Observe that for kt = kµ the net worth is given
as wt = (1− µ)m and the output as yt = 11−α (1− µ)m. Using kt+1 = wt and
ht+1 = σhyt + (1− δh)ht allows to determine the threshold explicitly as
h =
1
1− δh
[(
1
B
α
1− α
)− 1
γ
((1− µ)m) 1−αγ − σh
1− α (1− µ)m
]
. (14)
The non-distortionary case occurs for ht > h (above the dashed line in Fig. 2).
3.2 The distortionary case
The distortionary case, in which the borrowing constraint impinges upon the dyna-
mics and financial frictions play a role, occurs if ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
|kt=kµ < B, or if ht < h
(see below the dashed line in Fig. 2). Again, for low kt agents do not intend to start
Bad projects because of the high profitability of Good projects. Increasing kt redu-
ces the profitability of Good projects and at some kB < kµ the profitability of both
investment types will be equal and agents start to prefer Bad projects. However,
since the wage rate and thus the net worth is still low, the maximum pledgeable
rate of return for credit is lower than the return on Good investments and agents
cannot obtain the required credit – the borrowing constraint is still binding and
agents continue to invest only in the Good projects. In that region of the phase
space, the law of motion is given by:
kt+1 = ΨL = k
α
t h
γ
t . (15)
Further increasing kt raises the agents’ wage rate and thus net worth, which
increases the maximum pledgeable rate of return on credit and eases the borrowing
constraint. At a threshold kc, the borrowing constraint is satisfied with equality
(while the entire net worth is still invested in Good projects) and the maximum
pledgeable rate of return on credit is equal to the profitability of Good projects. kc
is thus implicitly defined by ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= α
1−αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1 = R(kt, ht) =
µmB
m− kαt hγt
,
in which kt+1 = k
α
t h
γ
t (= wt). Beyond this threshold, for kt > kc (but kt < kµ)
credit starts to flow into Bad projects. Investment in Good projects is determined
by ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= α
1−αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1 = R(kt, ht) =
µmB
m− kαt hγt
. Solving for kt+1, the law of
motion for that region of the phase space is determined by
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kt+1 = ΨM =
(
1
µB
α
1− α
(
1− k
α
t h
γ
t
m
)) 1
1−α
(ht+1)
γ
1−α . (16)
After crossing the next threshold, kt > kµ, the borrowing constraint is not binding
any more, and investment in Good projects kt+1 is determined by the profitability
constraint, i.e. by ∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= B. All additional credit flows into Bad projects
and the dynamics follow again ΨR,
kt+1 = ΨR =
(
1
B
α
1− α
) 1
1−α
(ht+1)
γ
1−α . (17)
Fig. 2: Phase space
Tab. 1 provides a qualitative and Tab. 2 a formal summary of the relevant thres-
holds and specifications. Fig. 2 indicates the phase space formed by those thresholds.
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Threshold Meaning
kt = kB Good is as profitable as Bad (non-distortionary case)
kt = kc BC starts to be binding
kt = kµ BC is not binding anymore
Tab. 1: Threshold values (qualitative)
Threshold General specification CD specification
kB
∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= B
kt+1 = wt
kB =
[
1
B
α
1−αh
γ
t+1
] 1
α(1−α)
h
− γ
α
t
kc
∂f(kt+1,ht+1)
∂kt+1
= R(kt, ht)
kt+1 = wt
kc =
[
1
µB
α
1−α
(
1− kαc hγt
m
)
hγt+1
] 1
α(1−α)
h
− γ
α
t
kµ PC = BC kµ =
[
m(1− µ)h−γt
]1/α
Tab. 2: Threshold values (analytical)
Putting above mentioned equations together, we now can construct the dynami-
cal system taking human capital as an external effect into account, for the non-
distortionary case, if ht > h:
Ψ :
(
kt+1
ht+1
)
→

kt+1 =

ΨL = k
α
t h
γ
t if kt ≤ kB
ΨR =
( α
B(1− α)
) 1
1−α
[
ht+1
] γ
1−α
if kt ≥ kB
ht+1 =
{
σh
1−αk
α
t h
γ
t + (1− δh)ht ∀kt
 (18)
and for the distortionary case, if ht < h:
Ψ :
(
kt+1
ht+1
)
→

kt+1 =

ΨL = k
α
t h
γ
t if kt ≤ kc
ΨM =
[ 1
µB
α
1− α
(
1− kαt hγtm
)] 11−α [
ht+1
] γ
1−α
if kc ≤ kt ≤ kµ
ΨR =
( α
B(1− α)
) 1
1−α
[
ht+1
] γ
1−α
if kt ≥ kµ
ht+1 =
{
σh
1−αk
α
t h
γ
t + (1− δh)ht ∀kt

. (19)
Thus, the system is continuous piecewise smooth, two dimensional in k and h,
with seven parameters, α, γ, µ,m,B, σh, δh. Following restrictions apply: α+ γ < 1,
0 < µ, σh, δh < 1, B > 0 and m > 1. Similar to the original model, the law of
motion for kt is crucial for the dynamics. But as human capital has an additional
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positive effect on the next period net worth, it also affects the magnitude of k
each period. For the learning-by-producing external effect of human capital, the
parameter σh indicates the strength of this effect. This knowledge is assumed to be
highly persistent therefore the depreciation rate (or rate of forgetfulness) is set far
below unity.
Remark: Matsuyama et al. (2016) assume thatW (K¯) = K¯ (the maximal attaina-
ble net worth) is always lower than m, the fixed investment size parameter for Bad
projects. Due to the normalisation of the system, the assumption K¯ < m holds for
m > 1. So, young agents who want to start a Bad project always need to borrow
as the net worth is necessarily too low. In our model, this assumption might be
violated for high values of the production function parameters α and γ. Due to
the human capital the available net worth could be much higher than the required
investment size, m, such that agents have excess net worth which they can also lend
(in such situations, credit becomes negative). But this features does not affect the
general stability results as it (under certain parameter configurations, though far
away from empirical justifiability) just drives the equilibrium values of physical and
human capital, return on labour and income beyond unity. But the agents will not
find borrowers for excess net worth as all the other agents have enough to invest.
Thus, the excess net worth remains an unproductive (in the sense of no return)
residual which will not produce any additional dynamics. Note that in a situation
of negative credit, the system will always reach its fixed point, so the dynamics of
the central dynamic variables are, after an initial transient phase, converging to an
equilibrium value. As we are interested in analysing cyclical characteristics we stick
to a parametrisation which ensures that we are in such regions. In general, one can
avoid the situation by quasi endogenising the fixed investment size parameter m, as
a excess percentage of the maximum attainable net worth.
4 Dynamic analysis
In this version of the model, human capital enhances the profitability of the next
generation’s Good projects (higher ht increases ρ
e
t+1 =
∂f(kt+1,ht)
∂kt+1
= α
1−αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1,
the expected reward of starting a Good project in period t). Thus, investing into
Bad projects, which neither generate pecuniary nor technological externalities for the
next generation, becomes more unattractive. In terms of the model, the profitability
constraint tightens up. Through this mechanism human capital is expected to serve
as a stabiliser as it creates more incentives (i.e. profit) to start Good projects. On
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the other hand, it also might boost the general output as the consumption of the
old generation (which allocated net worth at the end of period t) at the end of
period t + 1 is now higher, as human capital is also included in the final good, the
numeraire.
4.1 Bifurcation phenomena
Before starting the dynamical analysis, we shall point to the fact, that by setting γ =
0 and h0 = 0, the model collapses in the original Matsuyama et al. (2016) model. We
will present the dynamics of kt, the physical capital stock per unit of labour. As the
two dimensional equation which governs the dynamics is of complicated structure we
offer numerical simulations to determine stability features. The critical parameters
in the original paper were the strength of the credit frictions (µ), the gross return
of Bad projects (B) and the fixed investment size (m) of the Bad projects. Our
set-up provides new parameters concerning human capital elasticity (γ) which can
be seen as component representing the economy’s structure, a depreciation rate (δh)
and the strength of the external effect σh. Thus, a comprehensive study of the
dynamics might go beyond the scope of this paper and therefore we concentrate on
a parametrisation which is comparable to the baseline model from Matsuyama et al.
(2016). For a first analysis, we fix δh = 0.05 and σh = 0.5 and check the dynamical
system in the (µ,B) parameter space5. For the capital share we follow the standard
macroeconomic literature and set α = 0.4. Although we point out that this model
is highly stylized therefore an exact calibration of the model seems not achievable.
Thus, we set our parameters comparable close to Matsuyama et al. (2016). The two
dimensional bifurcation diagram6, displayed in Fig. 3, shows the effect of an increase
in γ on the (µ,B) parameter space.
We observe a shrinkage of the area with high-order periodicity (white) but also an
expansion of parameter combinations which eventually lead to period two and four
cycles7. On the one hand we find a destabilisation as a stable fixed point is harder to
achieve with intermediate values of γ but also irregular cycles (i.e. cycles with period
higher than 11) are less likely to occur. Moreover, the parameter regions where a
fixed point is observed also shrink, additionally pointing towards destabilising effects.
5This is consistent with the assumption that human capital depreciation is low, thus the accu-
mulation highly persistent. Additionally, the strength of the external effect is chosen to be of
intermediate magnitude.
6The textbook definition of a bifurcation refers to a qualitative change in the long-run dynamics
as a model parameter changes.
7A note on definition: A period n-cycle is a cycle which has a duration length of n time steps.
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Fig. 3: (µ,B) plane with γ = 0.05 (left), γ = 0.10 (center) and γ = 0.15 (right).
Numbers indicate the periodicity of stable cycles. The white regions
indicate a periodicity higher than 12.
But, however, a much higher gross rate of return of Bad projects is necessary to
enter the regions of high periodicity compared to the original model. Thus, we
conclude that human capital serves as stabiliser in the following way: It pushes up
the profitability of Good projects such that the net worth of young agents after their
working period is higher. This enables young agents to invest in high profitable Bad
projects as the net worth requirement (i.e. the borrowing constraint) is fully met.
This leads under sufficiently low frictions (agents can pledge a higher amount of
return, namely µB, see middle branch of Eq. (19), to the lender) to a credit shift
towards Bad projects. Without human capital the result would be a deterioration of
the next generation’s net worth due to the lack of Good projects. However, human
capital changes that situation as the net worth is still high enough which eventually
avoids the propagated mechanism of boom and bust cycles. On the other hand,
for intermediated high values of B we indeed observe rich and complex dynamic
behaviour of k, the physical capital.
The crucial parameter for the importance of human capital is γ, technically indi-
cating the output elasticity of human capital. Put differently, this also expresses the
cost share of output whose stability impact we will discuss in the following section.
4.1.1 Corridor Stability
We stick now to the case, where we enter the region of high periodicity to check
for intriguing dynamic phenomena. For instance, Matsuyama et al. (2016) reports
the so-called corridor stability for the parameter µB which exhibits not only some
interesting dynamic properties but also offers a strong economic rational. As we use
an augmented production function we concentrate again on γ, the production share
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of human capital. We find the same phenomenon for certain γ-values depending on
the magnitude of B and µ, where all other parameters left unchanged. The credit
market friction parameter is set µ = 0.25 such that a convergence towards a stable
steady state could be achieved without human capital.
Fig. 4: Bifurcation scenario of γ (with B = 5, µ = 0.25); arrows indicate the di-
rection of computation
We report the bifurcation scenario of parameter γ by tracing Fig. 4 from left to
right. The left panel of Fig. 4 shows the bifurcation structure for an intermediate
range of γ-values. With sufficient low importance of human capital (i.e. a low
γ-value) we observe a fixed point for kt near 0.14. Reaching the green point, the
computation of the system’s eigenvalue yields minus unity, stating that the system
lost its stability via a flip bifurcation. A period-two cycle is born. By enlarging the
interval around γ = 0.14 (see boxed region) and varying the computing directions8
we observe following phenomena: There is a coexisting stable period two cycle and
a stable fixed point and, moreover, also a period two saddle point (indicated by the
dotted line). To confirm those presumptions we perform some numerical simulations
which lead to results reported in Tab. 3. There is a triple cycle coexistence, a fixed
point, a stable and a saddle period two cycle.
Period Classification Lx = {(k∗, h∗)} colour in Fig. 5
[1] stable {(0.137, 10.512)} green
[2] stable {(0.062, 10.480), (0.236, 10.341)} yellow
[2] saddle {(0.077, 10.509), (0.207, 10.404)} white
Tab. 3: Numerical simulation results, γ = 0.1458, where Lx indicates the periodical
fixed points.
8We initialise on the previous value of kt.
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This is exactly the phenomenon of corridor stability which Matsuyama et al.
(2016) reported for the parameter product µB. The corridor is spanned by the
unstable period two cycle (see dotted line). The parameter γ indicates the impor-
tance of human capital in the production process. If a shock hits this parameter the
magnitude of the shock is crucial for the system. This corridor stabilty implies that
the system is robust and self-correcting against small shocks but unstable against
shocks with higher magnitude (see Leijonhufvud (1973) for a first comment and a
qualitative treatment of this issue). In this situation even a small positive shock in
γ becomes catastrophic and irreversible if the flip bifurcation point is crossed. The
latter means by reverting to the original parameter value, we will not come back to
the stable fixed point but remain at the (stable) period two cycle (transition from
the red to the blue bifurcation path in Fig. 4). The former characteristic is crucial
for our model: Human capital brings another possible component into the model as
it produces instability for a wide parameter range of γ.
Moving on, the amplitude of the period-two cycles gradually decreases until the
red point. The bifurcation at the red point is a border collision bifurcation (BCB)
as the trajectory crosses the kµ border, thus it moves from the second (ΨM from
Eq. (19)) to the third regime. For γ  0.257 the trajectory stays at the third regime.
Out of a period two cycle a fixed point is born and the stability of the system
is ensured for an intermediate human capital share. At least at this parameter
configuration human capital produces stability. Also in the augmented model the
corridor stability remains present for the friction parameter µ. We refer for a detailed
mathematical treatment to Sushko et al. (2014) and Matsuyama et al. (2016).
Most interestingly the basin of attraction9, displayed in Fig. 5, shows some struc-
tures which we need to discuss in detail. The red area indicates a fixed point basin
and the blue area a period two basin. The boundary between the period two and
the fixed point basin is the kµ threshold. That is where the borrowing constraint is
not binding any more. The basin boundary is spanned by the unstable period two
cycle, forming a corridor. The coloured dots refer to the period and its stability
property (see Tab. 3 for numerical evidence).
From an economic perspective we want to stress the following: Human capital has
an ambiguous effect on the system’s stability. In an economy where human capital is
either relatively negligible or sufficiently important, we do not observe any stability
distortions. But, however, there exists a parameter region where human capital is a
factor for instability due to the period two cycle. In this region we also observe the
9In terms of dynamical system theory, a basin of attraction of an attractor is the set of all initial
conditions converging, after sufficient transient iterations, to that attractor.
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Fig. 5: Basin of attraction (left) and basin boundaries (right) with γ = 0.1458
phenomenon of corridor stability. So with a rising importance of human capital it is
necessary to endure a transition period which might come with some instability. Put
differently, the output shares or the cost share of human capital regarding the output
reflects the compositions of sectors in an economy. Our result suggests that small
sectoral shifts tend to be robust regarding the stability of output. In scenarios where
large shifts occur (e.g. transition from agricultural based economies over industrial
to service based economies) instability might be more persistent and comes with
higher frequency of boom and bust cycles.
4.1.2 Interaction of frictions and human capital
This section analyses the interaction effects between the human capital parameter
and the strength of the credit market friction. There exists a [µ, γ]-parameter con-
tinuum where periods higher than order 12 occur. The left panel of Fig. 6 shows
this situation and the right panel shows an enlargement of the boxed area on the
left panel. The line traces the one dimensional bifurcation in Fig. 7.
The boundary between the fixed point and the period two cycle parameter range
has a clear structure. The fixed point looses its stability through a flip bifurcation,
i.e. the numerical evaluation of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian equals minus unity.
Due to the complicated structure of the Jacobians (recall, that each of the three
regimes has its own Jacobian) an analytical treatment is omitted. Nevertheless,
numerical evaluations of the value of the Jacobian will be provided. A closer look
shows the rich internal bifurcation structure of the parameter µ pointing towards
fractal patterns.
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Fig. 6: (µ, γ) plane with α = 0.4 (left) and enlarged box (right). Numbers indicate
length of stable cycle.
Fig. 7: Bifurcations scenario of µ (left) and enlarged box (right).
By fixing γ = 0.088 we trace the bifurcation of µ through the horizontal line and
observe the structures which is shown in the left panel of Fig. 7. The boxed area is
enlarged in the right panel. We observe a rich internal bifurcation structure, which
can be seen on the right panel.
Not only the dynamics but also the economic implications are important. Espe-
cially in economies with a very low human capital share, each change (or shock)
in the financial sphere due to a variation in µ, the credit friction parameter, might
lead to instability. This is close to the general conclusions from empirical studies
which also report that financial market development might come with some costs,
see, e.g. Acemoglu & Zilibotti (1997), Greenwood & Smith (1997) and Martin &
Rey (2004). This highly depends on the value of the human capital share. These
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findings serve as a clear indicator for the robustness providing character of human
capital. With high human capital shares the economy becomes robust and more
resilient for changes of financial frictions as the steady state (needless to say, not
the value of the fixed point) becomes invariant under changes in µ.
4.2 Time series
As mentioned above those model specifications lead, under certain parameter con-
tinua, to aperiodic and ’stochastic looking’ time series patterns even though the
model is completely deterministic. Therefore we present some time series of the
central dynamic variables to highlight this characteristic. As our model involves a
three-regime law of motion with endogenous regime switching for physical capital
k, we are able to trace the trajectory through the different regimes. In each figure
discussed below the regimes corresponding to the upper trajectory is shown where
each point of kt is realised in one of the regime displayed in the lower figure.
In Fig. 8 we simulated a scenario where the human capital share is quite small. An
asymmetric period 5-cycle is interrupted by periods of stability (around period 120)
with a consecutive amplifying cyclicity. Human capital shows the same irregular
pattern except of the following: At the beginning we also observe an asymmetric
period 5-cycle but with a clear decreasing trend. During the stability period human
capital experiences a steady increase again with a following up-and-down pattern
towards a decreasing trend interrupted by a short period of growth. Looking at the
regimes one can immediately see that during the periods of stability the trajectory
remains in the middle branch of the map, even though this regime is not a guarantor
for stability (see around period 140). By varying the initial conditions (not displayed
here), k0, h0, we observe under this parameter set a completely different trajectory,
pointing towards chaotic characteristics. By increasing the human capital share,
γ, we observe (see Fig. 9) a symmetric period 3-cycle, following the up-up-down
pattern. A bust is followed by two recovery periods with growth eventually busting
again. The same can be found for human capital. The regime figure reports a
periodic switching between all three regimes, following the pattern: Boom (ΨM) ⇒
Bust (ΨR) ⇒ Recovery (ΨL) ⇒ Boom (ΨM) ⇒ Bust (ΨR) ⇒ ... Put differently, in
terms of the the model’s narrative: After the bust, the deterioration of the borrowers
net worth causes that agents are not longer able to finance Bad projects (i.e. the
borrowing constraint is severely binding) which results that the credit is shifted
towards Good projects. This shift drives up the net worth which eventually eases the
borrowing constraint and allows that credit starts again flowing into Bad projects,
19
ultimately creating a boom phase. And the circle starts again. These findings
are in line with the evolution of human capital which follows the same pattern,
lagged for one period. Handing over to a scenario where γ = 0.30 (see Fig. 10),
a symmetric period 2-cycle is observable. Increasing γ even more, the system’s
trajectories are attracted to its fixed point: a steady state in physical and human
capital is reached after sufficient transient periods. For this scenario we see an
alternating pattern between regime ΨL and ΨR, meaning that we are in the non-
distortionary case (see Eq. (18)) where the borrowing constraint is never binding.
Here, the intergenerational transfer of human capital can be clearly seen. A bust in
physical capital leads to a one period later bust in human capital as the Bad projects
fail to generate both, human capital and next generation labour demand. Notice,
that in both latter scenarios the booms and busts are lagged for human capital. As
an example consider Fig. 9. For period 100 physical capital experiences its boom
whereas human capital is just in its recovery step, subsequently reaching its boom
period. At this point the evolution of physical capital again busts. For a more
clear comparison, see Fig. 10, where boom and bust characteristics are alternating
for physical and human capital. Recalling the law of motion for human capital,
ht+1 =
σh
1−αk
α
t h
γ
t + (1 − δh)ht, this behaviour becomes clear. A boom in physical
capital means that the majority of agents invested in Good projects in the previous
period which produce human capital as external effect. This leads to a boom of
human capital for the next generation as it is intergenerationally transferred. As
the bust period for physical capital occurred the next generation spillover effects are
declining which results in busting human capital. To certain extend human capital
amplifies the recovery of the overall economy.
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Asymmetric fluctuations
Regimes ΨL and ΨM visited aperiodically
Notes : Parameter specification:α = 0.4,m = 1.05, B = 5, µ = 0.05, σh = 0.5, δh = 0.05
Fig. 8: γ = 0.05; Upper panel: Trajectory for physical (left) and human (right)
capital after 100 transient periods. Lower panel: Visited regime
(ΨL,ΨM ,ΨR) of kt.
Symmetric 3-cycle
Regimes ΨL and ΨM visited aperiodically
Fig. 9: γ = 0.15
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Symmetric 2-cycle
Periodic alternation between regimes ΨL and ΨR
Fig. 10: γ = 0.30
5 Income assessment
Since the law of motion is derived and a first dynamical analysis of the system is
conducted, we move on to a closer look to the factor income distribution. The
model set-up allows us to distinguish between labour and capital income. Whereas
the former only is earned by young agents the latter is distributed in various ways
between the old agents.
5.1 Definition and Computation
First of all, we give some clarification about the definition of income in this aug-
mented model. We need to take the intergenerational links and structures as well
the different forms of income into account. So the overall income, defined as la-
bour and investment income from a functional income perspective, in point t + 2
is contributed by two generations, the young (belonging to generation Lt+1) and
the old (generation Lt) agents. As the young simply receive labour income wt+1
from working during period t + 1 to t + 2 this generation’s contribution is easy to
grasp. Whereas old agents get return from net worth allocation (i.e. investment) at
point t+ 1 depending on investment decision. To briefly recap possible choices: (a)
starting a Good project, (b) starting a Bad project or (c) lend to other agents. As
22
the availability of finance for Bad projects is determined by the available net worth,
we have carefully check which regime of the dynamics governing map, Eq. (19),
applies. We now start to describe the income It+2 composition step-by-step where
Lt denotes the old and Lt+1 the young generation, respectively
10. In equilibrium,
rt+1 = ρt+1 =
α
1−αk
α−1
t h
γ
t and wt = k
α
t h
γ
t hold. Fig. 11 sketches the generational
income structure.
Fig. 11: Generational income structure
First, assume net worth is too low or the financial friction is too severe such that
Bad projects cannot be started (we are located at regime ΨL of map Eq. (19)).
Therefore the income is determined by
It+2|ΨL = (kαt+1hγt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage young
) · Lt+1 + ( α
1− αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1wt︸ ︷︷ ︸
return old (Good)
) · Lt (20)
Now, assume that Bad projects can and will be started (we are located either at
the ΨM or ΨR branch of Eq. (19)). Therefore the income is determined by young
agents’ labour remuneration and investment return from either Good or Bad projects
or lending. This brings up the question how big the generational share of lenders,
Good and Bad investors actually is. In period t + 2 this question only concerns
the old generation Lt. From the condition that aggregate credit supply must equal
aggregate credit demand, we derive that wt = kt+1 + mXt where Xt denotes the
measure of Bad projects, hence the share of agents investing in Bad. This yields
the following identities where the lenders are simply the residual agents who neither
run a Good nor a Bad project. The profits from Bad projects are determined by
return minus credit repayments, mB−(m−wt)rt+1 and the return for Good projects
analogously to the first case. Lenders simply receive the interest payments from Bad
10Recall that in each generation a unit mass of agents is born, thus Lt = Lt+1 = 1. By adding
those generational identifiers, the reader can easily trace through the intergenerational traps.
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investors.
LGt =
kt+1
wt
with return RGt+1 =
α
1− αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1wt (21)
LBt =
wt−kt+1
m
with return RBt+1 = mB − (m− wt)rt+1 (22)
LLt = Lt − LGt − LBt with return RLt+1 =
α
1− αk
α−1
t+1 h
γ
t+1(m− wt) (23)
Knowing that, we construct the income equations for the subsequent regimes as
follows, which completes the income assessment.
It+2|ΨM ,ΨR = (kαt+1hγt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage young
) · Lt+1 +RGt+1 · LGt +RBt+1 · LBt +RLt+1 · LGt︸ ︷︷ ︸
income old
(24)
5.2 Analysis
We will take now a deeper look how the income distribution between the young
and the old generation as well as the group size of the old generation (regarding
investment) will change during times of cyclicity. As a consequence of the model
framework the income distribution underlies the same cyclical behaviour as the other
variables. Remember from the previous sections that human capital in general drives
up the net worth of the young agents as they earn both, the marginal product of
it and the labour remuneration. This, in general, eases the borrowing constraint
enabling the credit to flow in the most profitable projects. The transition from
’worker’ earning labour income to ’capitalist’ earning investment income results from
the overlapping generations set-up. Fig. 12 displays a situation with high frictions
and low human capital importance.
Apparently, Bad projects are subject to a higher change in the amplitude throug-
hout the whole simulation whereas Good projects suffer from less volatile mo-
vements. We see that a high share of Good projects does not necessarily causes
a stable income path. Moreover, it seems that especially in times where the net
worth is high (indicated by the high share of Bad projects and low share of lenders)
a more or less persistent high income can be observed. As the volatility in Good and
Bad projects starts again an immediate translation into a high income fluctuation
can be observed.
To check whether these patterns are sensitive to a change in the human capital
importance we show some histograms, in Fig. 13, of income with different values of
γ. We can conclude that in general human capital stabilises the income fluctuations
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Notes : Parameter specification:α = 0.4, γ = 0.035,m = 1.05, B = 5, µ = 0.048, σh = 0.5, δh = 0.05
Fig. 12: Shares of projects (left scale) and income (right scale)
when we are located in a region where asymmetric high order periodicity is prevalent.
But we also observe an expansion of low income regimes when we rise γ even though
the level of income experienced a rise.
In Fig. 13e-Fig. 13f the trajectory is trapped in a symmetric period six and period
four cycle11, explaining the regular shaped pattern.
11This is not immediately obvious when checking the histograms as the difference of the realised
values is not sufficiently large to be captured in a different bin.
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a γ = 0.001 b γ = 0.002
c γ = 0.003 d γ = 0.004
e γ = 0.005 f γ = 0.010
Notes : Parameter specification: α = 0.4, σh = 0.5, δh = 0.05, B = 5, µ = 0.048,m = 1.05, 10000
transients. Cycles observed: (a)-(d) asymmetric high periodicity, (e) symmetric period-six cycle,
(f) symmetric period-four cycle.
Fig. 13: Histograms of income under different γ-specifications
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For lower frictions we already found that physical and human capital reach a
fixed point. Therefore this holds also true for the income. However, it is of major
interest to check how the investment proportions of the old generation change under
different friction and human capital specifications. Following Tab. 4 and Tab. 5
report numerical simulation results.
HC share Good projects Bad projects Lending Income
γ = 0.035 0.23 0.31 0.46 2.60
γ = 0.100 0.20 0.37 0.43 2.87
γ = 0.200 0.15 0.51 0.34 3.40
γ = 0.250 0.13 0.62 0.25 3.92
Tab. 4: Investment shares with µ = 0.35, Numerical simulation results after 5000
transients.
Friction Good projects Bad projects Lending Income
µ = 0.15 0.38 0.35 0.27 2.79
µ = 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.32 2.69
µ = 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.38 2.63
µ = 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.43 2.60
Tab. 5: Investment shares with γ = 0.035, Numerical simulation results after 5000
transients
We immediately observe by inspecting Tab. 4 that higher human capital impor-
tance shifts investments towards Bad projects. This is mainly caused by the higher
net worth of the young generation which enables them, as the borrowing constraint
is eased, to invest in higher profitable investments. Even though the expected re-
turn of Good projects is increased by human capital, Bad projects are still more
profitable. Due to the higher net worth we also observe the deterioration of lending
as simply less credit is required. Even though the share of Good projects declines
the raising profitability of Good projects compensate that shift and the aggregated
income goes up. For a (fixed) low importance of human capital (see Tab. 5) we
confirm the results also reported in Matsuyama et al. (2016): The system gains
stability but the overall income decreases as a result of a deterioration of the net
worth. Agents need to borrow more to start Bad projects even though it is easier
resulting from an eased borrowing constraint.
27
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we examined the impact of human capital on an economy with irregular
output fluctuations which occurred due to credit flows into different investment
projects. Human capital serves as technological component by reducing the effect
of diminishing returns on physical capital. A learning-by-producing approach is
applied to model human capital and it is assumed to be transferred intergenerational.
We observed new dynamical features which have both, an immediate impact on the
system stability and an economic rational. It appears that the human capital share of
production has a significant though ambiguous impact on the stability. In general, a
higher human capital share tends to stabilise output measured in per capita physical
capital. But especially when the credit market friction is sufficiently high (i.e. µ is
sufficiently low) low human capital shares introduce some instability by amplifying
the cyclicity. The baseline model which we augment, developed by Matsuyama
et al. (2016), reports the feature of corridor stability for the credit market frictions
parameter. We identified the same feature for the human capital share. As human
capital serves as component of technological progress we highlight the importance
of technological shocks. A vast branch of literature in macroeconomic business
cycle modelling deals with exogenous shocks (for example, shocks in total factor
productivity, demand or supply) and their impact on stability characteristics. The
shocks are usually assumed to be stochastic and following a mean reverting process.
In the aftermath of the shock the system eventually returns to the equilibrium (the
duration depends on the shock’s persistence). Applied to our situation (i.e. the
parameter change affects the corridor stability region), the system is robust to small
shocks but suffers strongly from intermediate high shocks as it permanently looses
its stability. Tracing the human capital share through various scenarios of credit
market frictions, we observe that in situations where the human capital sector has
a small proportion, credit market frictions have a strong impact on the economy’s
stability. On the other hand, a high human capital share tends to make the system
resistant and resilient to shocks from the credit market as our simulation exercise
clearly showed. With a high human capital share irregular fluctuations eventually
vanish. This leads us to a first message regarding technological shocks. Transition
periods where production shares of the final good production change the economy
might slip into an unstable development path. We showed that this transition leads,
under the presence of corridor stability, to an irreversible and catastrophic change of
the output evolution. Such features unfortunately get lost as linear approximations
are applied which is commonly done for standard models. In a worst case this might
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lead to simply wrong policy recommendations. Thus, we want to stress the fact that
drawing policy recommendation out of a linearised model might induce contrary
effects like destabilising an economy and should therefore carefully be considered.
Moreover, an income distribution assessment shows that human capital has an
additional effect: in regions where asymmetric cycles occur a rise of human capital
importance leads to an expansion of low income regimes but also to an enhancement
of high income regimes. Additionally, an increase in income levels can be observed.
For parameter regions where a fixed point can be achieved (i.e. a region with
sufficiently low credit market frictions) human capital enhances the net worth of
young agents enabling credit to flow in the most profitable projects thus driving up
the general aggregated income. Thus selective policy actions towards human capital
might help to boost the overall income situation and the general resilience of the
economic system even under the presence of credit market frictions. A look at the
investment shares (i.e. Good and Bad projects and lending) shows the following:
High human capital shares lead to a shift in Bad projects and a decrease in Good
projects. Due to the rise of net worth we observe an increase of the income but
not the usual bust pattern. We conclude that, under the presence of human capital
spillovers, major destabilising features are weakened ultimately leading to a stable
output evolution.
Once again we would like to stress that human capital is an essential factor in
economic processes and therefore needs to be considered when dealing with business
cycle models. Moreover, the importance of regime-switching models in economics
in both, theoretical and empirical related work is also highlighted as important
dynamic phenomena can be captured with such an approach.
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